Introduction
Protecting Information Technology (IT) involves a number of interrelated factors. These include mission, available resources, technologies, existing policies and procedures, internal culture, contemporary threats, and strategic enterprise direction. In the face of this formidable list, a structured approach provides cost effective actions that allow the organization to manage its risks.
We face fundamental challenges that will persist for at least the next several years-It is difficult if not impossible to precisely quantify risk. IT threats and vulnerabilities change rapidly and continually. Limited organizational resources combined with mission restraints-such as availability and connectivity requirements-will insure that most systems will not be absolutely secure (if such security were even possible). In short, there is no technical (or administrative) "silver bullet." Protection is employing a stratified series of recommendations, matching protection levels against information sensitivities.
Adaptive and flexible risk management is the key to effective protection of IT resources. The cost of the protection must be kept less than the expected loss, and one must take into account that an adversary will not expend more to attack a resource than the value of its compromise to that adversary. Notwithstanding the difficulty if not impossibility to precisely quantify risk, the aforementioned allows us to avoid the trap of choosing a course of action simply because "it's safer" or ignoring an area because no one had explored its potential risk.
~
Recommendations for protecting IT resources begins with discussing contemporary threats and vulnerabilities, and then procedures h r n general to specific preventive measures. From a risk management perspective, it is imperative to understand that today, the vast majority of threats are against UNIX hosts connected to the Internet.

Threats and vulnerabilities
IT Security threats (the potential for adverse action against a resource) and vulnerabilities (weaknesses that may be exploited by an adversary) change rapidly over time. To make the most effective use of our limited resources, we need to concentrate on those vulnerabilities being exploited today, prepare for those that seem likely to be soon exploited, and keep a watchful eye on the theore tically possible. Of course, clever adversaries could recognize this approach and switch to new methods as we stymie the old ones. What we've found, however, is that most attacks are copy-cat rather than original. When an attack fails at one location, most attackers move on to another location rather than change methodology.
(This last observation is a classic example of "crime displacement." When one community gets tough on crime, the criminals move to a new, easier neighborhood. fn today's environment, not only do security professionals usually have to accept displacement rather than being able to stop the activity, but they must also contend with the reverse issue. If your location's security is weaker than another, it will likely become a target. Further, once you become a target of successful attacks, you will become popular quickly, and continue to be the target for quite a while, even if you strengthen your defenses.) This assessment will address the threats and vulnerabilities of outsiders remotely exploiting insecure tiNIx workstations via the Internet and telephone access.
(There are other threats and vulnerabilities outside the scope of this assessment, such as insiders taking advantage of their position and special knowledge and viruses for PC's and Macintoshes.) Once outsiders obtain access to UNIX workstations, they frequently obtain privileged access on one or more workstations on a Local Area Network (LAN). They then install monitoring programs ("sniffers") to obtain the initial transactions of remote log on and file transfer sessions, capturing many host name/user name/password combinations as well as other access information. It's important to recognize that this immediately extends the vulnerability to all systems on the LAN that have reusable1 password authentication or exchange sensitive information.
There are many ways for intruders to gain initial access to UNIX workstations. They may exploit configuration weaknesses to obtain password files and then l"Reusab1e" passwords are the traditional kind that users may change periodically, but remain the same in between changes. "Non-reusable" passwords are those that change after each use, either because they are a function of time, or the function of a random and always changing challenge.
run an enhanced dictionary search against the file; they may exploit configuration weaknesses to obtain trusted access through remote log in capabilities (the "r" commands); they may exploit configuration weaknesses to add or alter entries in password files; they may exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in operating systems.
Once intruders gain privileged (or root) access, there is little they cannot do. They may install monitoring programs; they may create new or change existing accounts; they may substitute Trojan Horse2 software for legitimate systems, disguising their activities and/or leaving themselves backdoors for subsequent re-entry; they may launch attacks against other locations, causing you potential liability.
Preventive measures
The National Library of Medicine (NLM) must prevent the unauthorized access of all accounts, the unauthorized increase of account privileges, the revelation of sensitive information, the alteration of information, and do so while not compromising the availability or quality of its services.
Good security begins with good backups. The schedule must be commensurate with the value and time needed to create the information. Store backups securely and physically separate from the system. Keep a log of your backups, and keep the backups, themselves, for a long time. Most importantly, test the backups periodically.
We will now look at the special case of telephone access and then the specific NLM environment, breaking it into four categories. We will discuss each in turn, comprehensively describing how one safely connects to the Internet.
Secure telephone access
The telephone allows world wide access to any network that has dial in modems. Intruders routinely compromise telephone systems for two primary goals: (1) free service; (2) the ability to manipulate certain switching functions. These intruders are not nearly as common3 as the Internet intruders. They are most interested in obtaining free telephone access for themselves or to sell to other criminals who then resell these services for quick, lucrative profits. The Secret Service estimates that this activity, technically known as "toll fraud," was a three to four billion dollar criminal activity in 1993.
Modems used for inbound access on terminal servers and PC or timesharing systems are an obvious risk and need appropriate controls. We recommend keeping the modem telephone numbers confidential even as we recognize that such protective measures are usually of limited effectiveness.4 Even truly confidential numbers are discovered since intruders frequently use PC's to automatically dial every number in a telephone exchange, testing for modems.
Dial back5 modems have value, but it's important to recognize their limitations. Call forwarding and other attacks against telephone switches defeat dial back modems; but note that these kinds of attacks are signrficantly less frequent than Internet UNIX attacks-today. Dial back is also fairly inflexible when it comes to travel. Protect dial in modems with strong, frequently changed individual or non-reusable passwords. Shared passwords are usually a bad idea. Not only do they confound accountability, but they are never really secret. Strictly control modems on PC's since they may allow incoming access and the PC's usually lack any kind of authentication. An attacker can easily use PC on a local area network, such as Ethernet, to passively monitor its entire LAN segment.
3Unfortunately, "Phone Phreaking" as it's called is a relatively mature form of IT crime, and those who engage in it are rather sophisticated. 4So called "security through obscurity" rarely works against determined attackers for reasons that go beyond the scope of this document. This is not to say by any means that you shouldn't bother to limit knowledge of sensitive information-just don't reiy on such limitation as the primary mode of security. 5That is, modems programmed to only dial specific telephone numbers depending on the identification they receive.
The specific NLM environment
The NLM IT environment consists of the following: 
UNIX workstations
UNIX workstations connected to the Internet represent the vast majority of vulnerabilities in today's environment. The recommendations below in "Connecting securely to the Internet" detail how to protect these hosts.
Non-UNIX mainframe
Intruders have not targeted IBM mainframes in the sense of discovering and exploiting their vulnerabilities. This is not to say that they won't-or can't. Today's mainframe threat is the capture of passwords and other access information on a Local Area Network by a monitor installed on a compromised UNIX workstation. Note that intruders may exploit improperly protected FTP 
Securing the host
The following subsections discuss system security enhancements related to patches, authentication, account management, file ownership, file integrity, accounting, and configuration checks for uND(: hosts.
Patches
Vulnerabilities and scripts to exploit them are regularly being posted to mailing lists and newsgroups. Subscribe to the lists bugtraq (send email to n- 
Account Management
Verify that all vendor supplied default accounts that support logins have strong passwords. Older operating systems and third party software systems are especially suspect.
Lock out accounts that do not support logins (but are needed for other purposes),
by following these steps.
Place an asterisk (*) in the password field in /etc /passwd or the shadow file Change the login shell to /bh/false Change the home directory to /nodir Note that you cannot comment out a passwd entry. There is no comment character, and a # in column 1 becomes the first character of the username.
Dormant accounts are a prime target for intruders. Periodically expire unused accounts automatically if the system allows it-manually if necessary.
Avoid shared (group) accounts. Use group access permissions to share common files. If more than one person needs the same home directory, use multiple user names rather than sharing the account and password. Do not share privileged root accounts; rather, create distinct privileged accounts (user 0, group 1).
Carefully control access to root. Do not allow direct root logins, especially over the network. Remove the secure keyword from / e t c / t t y s o r /etc/ttytab, so those devices will not support a privileged login. This will force users to login to an unprivileged account and then su to root. Carefully control the number users allowed to do that, and remember to add them to the wheel group. 
File ownership
File integrity
Intruder Trojans are increasingly comrnon and nearly impossible to detect. They may have the same access, modification, and i-node change time as the original, the same file size, and the same /bin/sum checksum. We thus need strong authentication, including cryptographic checksums.8
The Security Profile Inspector (SPI) is a very effective general purpose product. It is free to sponsoring government agencies and available at nominal charge to all 8The standard /bin/sum check was designed to catch unintentional changes (such as transmission noise). It can be easily defeated by a determined adversary. Cryptographic checksum cannot be. 
others (see footnoteg
Configuration checks
Automated tools for checking the security of system configurations include SM, Tiger, COPS, and Securscan. In general they check file ownerships, known vulnerabilities, weak configurations, and patch status. SPI, mentioned above, is the recommended product (see footnote for details to acquire it). It is the most comprehensive and is actively and continually maintained under sponsorship of multiple U.S. government agencies. It is the ongoing work of the Computer Security Technology Center at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, under the project management of Tony Bartoletti (510.422.3881, email azbklllnl. gov). As already discussed, SPI also checks the status of system binaries. 
COPS (Computer Oracle and
Network Controls
The following sections discus security enhancements related to securing the network-in contrast to the host. Topics include general philosophy; the Internet daemon-configuration, problem protocols, and TCP wrappers; the portmapper-operation and securelib; other network daemons; and firewalls.
Overall philosophy
Control what services youoffer-f inger, rusers, systat. Control who may connect to your services-local machines, local site, world. Control what information your systems will give out for free-login banners, DNS HINFO, WWW.
For example, will a t e h e t to port 25 reveal your sendmail version?
The Internet daemon 
X-Windows
X was designed to allow easy sharing of resources-security was an afterthought. If it can display a window on your serverlo, it can also monitor your keystrokes as well as insert keystrokes and events. There are three types of X access control: host-based using the xhos t command to limit access to selected hosts; "MIT Magic Cookie" using a random number stored in -/ . Xau t hor i ty;
and the XDM authorization, an encrypted extension of Magic Cookie for added security.
Gopher and Wide World Web
These new Internet services are extremely popular, easy to use, and provide vast amounts of new information. These servers distribute files to people who ask for them. '%e terminology in X for client and server may seem anti-intuitive at first. The display system is the "server"; the (sometimes remote) application is the "client."
Conclusions
Successfully securing today's Information Technology resources combines specific knowledge with hard work and persistence. To paraphrase one of America's founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson: the price of security is eternal vigilance. For the most part, the "bad guys" out there have everything to gain and nothing to fear. Until lawmakers and law enforcement come up to speed, we're going to have to take an effective defensive posture and stay at least on par if not ahead of the intruders. The information provided in this and accompanying documents will give you the specific knowledge. Through our consultation and interactions we'll be able to help you most effectively focus your hard work.
